Reserve uncertainty and the supply of international credit by Aizenman, Joshua & Marion, Nancy
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
RESERVE UNCERTAINTY
AND THE SUPPLY OF
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT
Joshua Aizenman
Nancy Marion
Working Paper 7202
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7202
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
July 1999
We wish to thank Linda Goldberg, James Gordon, and Changyong Rhee for data clarifications.  All opinions
expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 1999 by Joshua Aizenman and Nancy Marion.  All rights reserved.  Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.
Reserve Uncertainty and the Supply of International Credit
Joshua Aizenman and Nancy Marion
NBER Working Paper No. 7202
July 1999
JEL No.  F2, F3
ABSTRACT
This paper examines how increased uncertainty about an emerging market's international
reserves affects the willingness of foreign investors to supply international credits.  We illustrate the
relevance of this concern for South Korea during the recent financial crisis.  Using available
information ab ut Korea's reserves at the onset of the crisis, we show that "usable" reserves turned
out to be much lower than what a reasonable forecast would have predicted.  We then develop a
model of an emerging-market economy where there is sovereign risk and moral hazard is a problem
because agents expect the emerging market to bail out creditors with its reserves. 
 We show that reserve uncertainty has a non-linear effect on the supply of credit.  When the
expected reserve position of an emerging market is large relative to the potential bailout in bad states
of nature, reserve volatility does not matter.  However, the same amount of reserve volatility can
cause a large reduction in the supply of internationa  credit if the emerging market's foreign debt is
large nough or if the collapse of output forces the private sector to downgrade its priors about
repayment possibilities.  In addition, reserve volatility can reduce international credit if investors
become more pessimistic about the emerging market's reserve position. 
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I. Introduction
In October, 1997, turbulence in Hong Kong’s foreign exchange and equity markets
spread rapidly to other emerging markets.  During the same period, market participants
became aware that the Bank of Korea was unable to use a large share of its reserves because
it had previously placed them with foreign branches of domestic banks.  Uncertainty about
the size of South Korea’s “usable” reserves contributed to the crisis atmosphere in which
investors had to operate.  In this paper, we examine how increased uncertainty about an
emerging market’s reserves might affect the willingness of foreign investors to supply
international credit.  We show that increased reserve uncertainty has a nonlinear and
potentially large adverse effect on the supply of international credit.  As a result, it can
contribute to the liquidity shortage often experienced by emerging markets during a crisis.
We start with an overview of the events that led to increased uncertainty about
Korean reserves. Then, using available information about the reserve path before the onset
of the crisis, we show that official reserves and, even more dramatically, usable reserves,
turned out to be much lower that what a reasonable forecast would have predicted.
Next, we examine the impact of greater reserve uncertainty on the supply of
international credit.  We model an emerging-market economy where the private sector
believes the domestic authority will use its international reserves to bail out lenders.  The
moral hazard problem associated with domestic bailouts has been cited by various observers
as a contributing factor in the Asian financial crisis.1
We derive the supply of international credit to emerging markets when reserve
uncertainty interacts with uncertainty about the probability of a reserve-financed bailout.
                                                
1 See Krugman (1998) and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998).
2We show that when the expected reserve position of emerging markets is large relative to
the potential bailout in a bad state of nature, reserve volatility does not matter.  However,
the same amount of reserve volatility can cause a large reduction in the offered supply of
international credit if emerging-market debt is large enough or if the collapse of output
forces the private sector to downgrade its priors about repayment possibilities.  In addition,
reserve volatility can reduce international credit if investors become more pessimistic about
the expected reserve position of emerging markets.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II summarizes the evolution of Korean
reserves and compares the actual paths of reported and usable reserves with a forecast based
on an auto-regressive process. Section III describes the model and analyzes the effects of
lower expected reserve levels and increased volatility of reserves on the supply of
international credit extended to emerging markets.  Section IV concludes.
II.  South Korea’s reserve holdings
In the summer of 1997, concern mounted about whether South Korea could
withstand the financial crisis engulfing its Asian neighbors.   South Korea’s official reserve
position appeared strong.  After having seen its reserves decline during the first quarter of
1997 following labor unrest and the Hanbo Steel bankruptcy, the Bank of Korea reported a
recovery in its reserve holdings during the second quarter.  It announced that its May
reserve holdings were almost $32 billion.  It put its end-of-June holdings at $33.3 billion.
But over the summer and into the fall, there were rumors that South Korea’s central bank
had built up forward dollar liabilities by intervening in the forward market for won.  In
addition, stories circulated that the Bank of Korea was placing foreign-currency deposits
with foreign branches of domestic Korean banks.  It was not clear at the time whether this
3emergency short-term liquidity support for Korean banks was affecting official reserves.
As it turned out, the severity of the liquidity pressures facing these banks meant that the
central-bank deposits could not be withdrawn.  Consequently, the international reserves the
Bank of Korea could use in a crisis were considerably less than its reported official
reserves.
Indeed, the gap between South Korea’s “official” and “usable” reserves turned out
to be sizeable.  The International Monetary Fund later reported that while official Korean
reserves fell from $31 billion to $24 billion between the end of October and early
December, 1997, usable reserves were only about $ 6 billion (Adams et. al. , 1998, p. 20).
Figure 1 shows the growing gap between official and usable reserves as the crisis
approached.  The Bank of Korea’s practice of placing deposits with foreign branches of
domestic banks actually began in the late 1980s, but the discrepancy between official and
usable reserves stayed relatively small through 1996.  At the end of 1996, only 10% of
official reserves were placed in such deposits, making the gap between official and usable
reserves $3.8 billion.  The discrepancy increased during 1997 as the Bank of Korea
extended additional liquidity support to troubled off-shore branches of Korean banks.  By
the end of June, 1997, the gap between official and usable reserves had grown to $8
billion.  By the end of November, the gap had risen to $17 billion.  (BOK news releases,
1998).
The size of the gap was unknown to investors when Thailand floated its currency
on July 2, 1997, triggering the start of the Asian crisis.  All investors had to go on were the
reported official reserve figures and rumors that some of those reserves could not be
accessed in case of an emergency.  When, a few weeks later, Kia Motors requested a debt
work-out with its major creditors to avoid bankruptcy, confidence was further undermined.
The OECD later reported that “the lack of timely, reliable information on the state of
(Korean) banks’ non-performing loans, official foreign exchange reserves and foreign debt
added to uncertainty” during this period. (OECD, 1998, p. 31).
4The Korean case raises an interesting set of questions.  How does uncertainty about
the level of reserves affect the behavior of foreign lenders?  Can reserve uncertainty
contribute to the onset of crisis?  Does it make more severe a crisis that has already begun?
Before examining these questions with the help of a model, we can get some
suggestive evidence on investor beliefs about Korean reserve levels by constructing
confidence bands around a prediction of reserves.  To obtain the prediction, we assume
that investors viewed Korean official reserves as following an auto-regressive process. We
therefore regress monthly Korean official reserves on a constant and lagged official
reserves for the period January, 1995-July, 1997, where the June, 1997, official reserve
holdings represent the last available data for use in estimation prior to the start of the Asian
crisis.  For these 30 observations, the regression results are:
                     F t
*    =  0.4679  +     0.8668  F t-1
*
                                                                              (1)
                                 (0.2373)       (0.0687)
where F *  is the logarithm of official foreign-currency reserves and standard errors of the
estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. The adjusted R2 is 0.84, the standard
error of the regression is 0.0350 and the Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.65 suggests that
serial correlation is not a serious problem.  Suppose foreign lenders had used equation (1)
to forecast Korean reserves after June, 1997.  What would be the implication of having
done so? 2
                                                
2 For small samples, one cannot reject the hypothesis that reserves follow a random walk.
Both the auto-regressive process and the random walk formulation have similar
implications for our topic of interest.  Estimating (1) through October 1997 does not affect
the main results.  Note that F t
*
 is measured in log($ billions).
5Figure 2 illustrates the data ultimately reported for official and usable reserves from
mid-1996 through mid-1998. 3  In addition, the figure shows the predicted values of
Korean official reserves for the estimation period based on the auto-regressive process and
the 95% confidence band surrounding that prediction.  For the period July, 1997 and after,
we assume that investors continued to use the June, 1997 official reserve report to predict
monthly reserves.  However, the confidence bands around the prediction widened to reflect
the growing uncertainty about the true value of reserves.  Note that even before Thailand
devalued the baht on July 2, usable reserves were considerably beneath the lower
confidence band.  After the Thai devaluation, Korean official reserves began to move
toward the lower confidence band, and shortly after the Hong Kong and Chinese stock
market crises hit on October 25, 1997, even official reserves moved below the lower
confidence band, while usable reserves were multiple standard deviations below the band.
Thus both officially-reported reserves and usable reserves turned out to be much lower
than any reasonable forecast.
                                                
3Some of the monthly observations in 1996 for usable reserves are unavailable, so missing
data are obtained by extrapolation.
6III.  The Model
Consider a global economy composed of a high-income countries and emerging-
market economies.  Agents in the high-income countries are risk neutral, so their
preferences over a two-period planning horizon are characterized by:
V º C1 +
C2
1+ r
          (2)
where r  is the rate of time preference and coincides with the risk-free interest rate.
Agents in the emerging-market economies have preferences represented by
V* º u(C1
* ) +
u(C2
*)
1 + r *
; u' > ; u" £ 0            (3)
We assume that r * > r  because the real interest rate in the emerging-market
economies is substantially above the rate in the high-income group.
The only exogenous source of uncertainty is a productivity shock to second-
period output in the emerging markets:
Y2
*
= Y* (1+ e )         (4)
where e  is a stochastic shock with probability density function f (e ) over the range
- e 0 £ e £ e 0 , with e 0 ³ 0.  All private agents are price takers.
The emerging-market economies may borrow internationally, but their ability to
borrow is constrained by the limited enforceability of international contracts.  Consider
the simple case where the emerging markets initially have no outstanding foreign debt.
Suppose that the high-income countries lend an aggregate amount B1
*  in period 1 to
private agents in the emerging-market group at a contractual interest rate of r.  In period
2, the borrowers must repay the loan, but because their output is uncertain, they may
default.
7Let S2  denote the debt repayment to foreign creditors in period 2.  In the event
of default, suppose creditors can penalize the borrowing countries by reducing their net
output by an amount c Y2
* .  The parameter c  reflects the bargaining power of foreign
lenders, where up to a fraction c  of output can be "confiscated" by lenders due to the
threat of embargoes, retaliatory trade measures and other actions.4  Consequently, the
effective ceiling on net resource transfers to creditors is:
S2 = min[(1+ r)B1
* , c Y2
*] (5)
The size of the productivity shock that makes the emerging-market countries
indifferent between repaying the loan or defaulting and facing the output penalty is e * ,
where e *  is determined by the condition (1+ r)B1
* = c Y* (1+ e * ) .  Thus
e * = max
(1+ r )B1
*
c Y*
- 1,- e 0
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú (6)
For realized productivity shocks between - e 0  and e
* , default saves the borrowers (at
the expense of the lenders) the difference between the contractual repayment and the
output penalty.  We denote this gap -- the potential bailout -- by b
b º (1+ r)B1
* - c Y*(1+ e ) = c Y* (e * - e ) (7)
The international credit market is risk neutral and characterized by competition
among banks that are fully informed about the debt exposure of the emerging-market
group.  Default by the emerging markets requires that creditor banks spend real
                                                
4The term c  is influenced by a host of factors that relate to the integration of markets.
8resources m  in order to verify the productivity shock and to enforce the transfer of
resources from emerging markets according to (5).5
Since large defaults are potentially destabilizing,  agents anticipate there is some
probability of a public bailout by the treasury or central bank of the emerging-market
block.6  We summarize the bailout expectations in a reduced-form equation, where the
bailout probability f *  increases with the default size:
f * = f * (b), where f *(b)[ ] ¢ > 0 for b > 0; f *(0) = f *(0)[ ] ¢ = 0 (8)
In the event of a default, emerging-market governments try to compensate
lenders for the revenue shortfall using their period-two net international reserves, F 2
* .
However, their reserve stockpile may not be adequate to accomplish a full bailout.
Creditor income earned on the loan in the case of default and a bailout is equal to either
the full bailout or the stock of reserves held by emerging markets, whichever is less,
plus the output penalty obtained by lenders:
min[b,F2
*] + c Y*(1+ e ) , (9)
                                                
5To simplify, we lump together the costs of monitoring and enforcement, and we ignore
the possibility of randomized monitoring. Boyd and Smith (1994) show that random
monitoring makes the financial contract more complex without altering first-order welfare
effects. See Townsend (1979) for a model where a debt contract with state verification
costs is optimal.  See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) for a related analysis.
6While our focus is on the impact of uncertainty about the international reserves of the
emerging markets, we can easily add within our framework uncertainty about the
possibility of eventual bailouts financed by the global financial community. For a model of
moral hazard generated by the expectation of a bailout by the international community, see
Aizenman and Turnovsky (1999).
9The intertemporal pattern of consumption and lending is determined by agents
who maximize their discounted expected utility.  The risk neutrality of lenders implies
that they offer an elastic supply of credit at an expected yield equal to their rate of time
preference.  Thus the interest rate on emerging-market debt (r) is determined by an
arbitrage condition that equates the expected yield on loans to emerging markets to the
risk-free return:
(1+ r)B1
* f( e )de +
e *
e 0
ò f * min[F2*,b] + c Y*(1+ e ) - m{ } f(e )de- e 0
e *
ò =
(1+ r )B1
* (10)
The left-hand side of (10) consists of two components: (i) the return on the loan in the
absence of default; (ii) the return on the loan in the presence of default, which equals the
possible bailout and the share of foreign output claimed in a default, all less
enforcement costs.
 Using (7), we can rewrite the left-hand side of (10) as:
(1+ r)B1
* + f * min[F2
*,b] + c Y* (1+ e ) - (1+ r)B1
* - m{ } f(e )de
- e 0
e *
ò =
(1+ r)B1
* + f * min[F2
*,b] - c Y*(e * - e ) - m{ } f(e )de =
- e 0
e *
ò
(1+ r)B1
* - b + m - f * min[F2
*,b]{ } f( e )de
- e 0
e *
ò
(11)
Equations (10) and (11) imply that the financial premium charged to emerging markets
takes into account the riskiness of these loans:
r - r =
b + m - f * min[F2
*,b]{ } f(e )de
- e 0
e *
ò
B1
* (12)
10
Note that monitoring and enforcement costs are passed on to borrowers by way of
higher borrowing rates.
For future reference, we will want to use a rearranged version of (12):
b + m - f * min[F2
*,b]{ } f( e )de
- e 0
e *
ò - (r - r )B1* = 0 (12')
We now examine how uncertainty about reserves held by emerging markets
affects the supply of international credit they can obtain.  Consider the simplest form of
international reserve uncertainty that gives rise to a gap between "official international
reserves" and “actual reserves”.  Suppose actual reserves in period two are either low or
high with equal probabilities:
F2
* =
F *(1- l )   with probability 0.5
F *(1+ l )   with probability 0.5
ì 
í 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
(13)
where F *  is the expected, or officially reported, value of reserves and reserve volatility
is given by l , with 1 ³ l ³ 0.7  Market participants in period one have information only
about the distribution and expected value of reserves.
The scarcity of reserves does not bind for small bailouts.  This would be the case
if
                                                
7The specification in (13) is the simplest way to model reserve uncertainty.  The key
results of the model, summarized below in Proposition 1, hold for other distributions of l ,
such as the uniform or truncated normal.
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b £ F *(1- l ) (14)
or equivalently, if
     (1+ r)B1
* - c Y *(1+ e ) £ F *(1- l ) (14')
We define e  as the value of the productivity shock that requires emerging markets to
use all their reserves to meet the bailout in the state where reserves are low.  This value
of e  makes (14')  hold as an equality and is given by :
e = max[
(1+ r)B1
* - F *(1- l )
c Y *
- 1,- e 0] (15)
We denote e  as the value of the productivity shock that equates the needed bailout to
total reserves in the state where reserves are high.  [where b = F *(1+ l ) ]:
e = max[
(1+ r)B1
* - F * (1+ l )
c Y*
- 1,- e 0]. (16)
For productivity shocks in the range e £ e £ e , the scarcity of reserves binds with
probability one-half in the event of a bailout.  If actual reserves are insufficient for a full
bailout, the bailout is partial and equals F *(1- l ) .  For productivity shocks e £ e , all
bailouts are constrained by reserves.  Assuming that a bailout occurs, the expected
bailout is summarized by
Eb min[F2
*,b]{ } =
b   for e < e £ e *
0.5[F *(1- l ) + b] for e £ e £ e 
0.5[F *(1- l ) + F *(1+ l )] = F * for e < e
ì 
í 
ï 
ï 
ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
ï 
           (17)
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where Eb is the expected size of the bailout, conditional on having a bailout.
Figure 3a illustrates the expected repayment of the loan for given values of the
productivity shock.  In the absence of a bailout, the repayment is the minimum of the
contractual debt repayment (curve PK) and the output penalty (curve NJ). This
repayment is traced out by the thick dashed curve NLK.  For shocks in the range
- e 0 £ e £ e * , if a bailout occurs, the expected repayment is equal to the return in the
absence of a bailout plus either a full bailout or a bailout that just exhausts the reserves
held by the emerging markets. This expected repayment ( c Y2
* + Eb min[b, F2
*]{ } ) is
illustrated by the curve ¢ N ¢ M ML .8   Figure 3a shows that the expected return to
creditors is constrained by reserve uncertainty when the productivity shock lies in the
range - e 0 £ e £ e .
Figure 3b demonstrates that for productivity shocks in the range e £ e £ e ,
greater reserve volatility (l ) also reduces the expected return to creditors.  Curve
¢ N QK  represents the expected repayment if the bailout takes place and there is no
reserve volatility (l  = 0).  A lower curve ¢ N ¢ M MK  corresponds to the expected
repayment if there is some reserve volatility (l  = 0.2), while an even lower curve
¢ N ¢ S SK  illustrates the expected repayment when reserve volatility is still higher
( l = 0.4).  Note that the range of shocks for which reserve volatility matters increases
as the level of volatility increases.
To calculate the expected repayment on the foreign loan when the shock is in the
default range - e 0 £ e £ e * , we substitute (17) into (10) to get:
                                                
8The curve ¢ N ¢ M ML  is drawn for c = 0.4; Y * = 1; F * = 0.2; r = 0.1; B1
* = 0.5 ,
and l = 0.2.
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             f * min[F2
*,b]{ } f(e )de
- e 0
e *
ò =
bf *{ } f(e )de +
e 
e *
ò
0.5[F *(1- l ) + b]f *{ } f(e )de +
e
e 
ò
F *f *{ } f( e )de
- e 0
e
ò
ì 
í 
ï 
ï ï 
î 
ï 
ï 
ï 
             (18)
Substituting (18) into (12), we note that the interest rate on loans to emerging markets
(r) is determined by:
b + m{ } f(e )de -
- e 0
e *
ò
bf *{ } f(e )de +
e 
e *
ò
0.5[F *(1- l ) + b]f *{ } f (e )de +
e
e 
ò
F *f *{ } f(e )de ]
- e 0
e
ò
é 
ë 
ê 
ê 
ê 
ê 
ê 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
ú 
ú 
ú 
ú 
ú 
- (r - r )B1
* = 0 (19)
Equation (19) defines the supply of international credit facing the economy
(along with the definitions of e *,e , e ).  We denote the left-hand side of (19) by H.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (12'), the slope of the supply of foreign credit
facing the emerging market is
                             
dB1
*
dr
=
- ¢ H r
¢ HB1*
            (20)
where
- ¢ Hr = B1
* f(e )de - m f (e *)
B1
*
c Y *
+
¶ min[F2
*,b]f * f(e )de
- e 0
e *
ò
¶ re *
e 0
ò
¢ HB1* = 1 + r - (1+ r) f(e )dee *
e 0
ò[ ] + m f(e *)1 + rc Y* -
¶ min[F2
*,b]f * f(e )de
- e 0
e *
ò
¶ B1
*
.
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We assume that the emerging-market economies operate along the upward-sloping
portion of the supply of international credit.9  Such would be the case if - Hr¢ > 0 and
HB1*
¢ > 0.10
Proposition 1:  Greater uncertainty about the reserve position of emerging
markets reduces the supply of international credit available to them.  If the
expected reserve position of emerging markets is adjusted downward, the supply
of credit shifts leftward.  Greater reserve volatility also shifts the supply of funds
leftward, and the shift is magnified as volatility rises or the probability of a
bailout increases.
                                                
9For a sufficiently low level of foreign debt, e * = - e 0 .  In these circumstances the critical
condition for dB1
* dr > 0 reduces to m f (- e 0) c Y
* < 1, a condition that is satisfied for a
low enough but positive enforcement cost, m . If m f (- e 0) c Y
* > 1, the supply of credit is
backward bending at interest rates marginally above the risk-free rate.  In these
circumstances it would be in the interest of borrowers to prohibit borrowing.
Consequently, we assume m f (- e 0) c Y
* < 1, so that the supply-of-credit curve is upward
sloping at relatively low interest rates.  In general, the supply curve may contain a
backward-bending section at high interest rates and external debt levels.  In these
circumstances, it would be in the interest of the borrowers to adopt policies that prevent
them from reaching the backward-bending section of the supply curve since such a point
entails lower welfare than the point where external borrowing is maximized. See
Aizenman (1989) for further discussion.
10The supply of international credit (defined implicitly by (19)) and the demand for
international credit jointly determine the equilibrium interest rate and lending level.  The
demand for credit is obtained from (3) when price-taking agents maximize expected utility.
We focus our attention on the supply side.
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Applying (19), we find that for a given interest rate, a downward revision in the
expected reserve level shifts the supply of credit curve leftward since:
dB1
*
dF *|r
=
f * f(e )de
- e 0
e
ò + 0.5(1- l )f * f(e )dee
e 
ò
¢ HB1*
> 0                    (21)
This reduction in the supply of international credit occurs whenever the stock of
emerging-market reserves is expected to limit the size of the bailout.  The reserve
constraint is binding when productivity shocks lie in the range - e 0 £ e £ e .  Note that
the drop in expected reserves has a non-linear impact since the reduction in the supply
of credit is magnified by the expected marginal bailout associated with an extra dollar of
reserves.  Hence, news about the expected reserve position of a country matters less for
countries where the commitment to a “no-bailout” policy is credible or where the
relative foreign indebtedness is small.
We also observe that an increase in reserve volatility shifts the supply of credit
curve leftward by the amount:
                          
dB1
*
dl |r
= -
0.5F * f *f (e )de
e
e 
ò
HB1*
' < 0                     (22)
An increase in volatility reduces the supply of credit in proportion to the expected
probability of a bailout in the range where the scarcity of reserves binds partially,
e £ e £ e .  This is the range where there is a full bailout if actual reserves turn out to be
high but only a partial bailout if actual reserves turn out to be low.  Recall that the
threshold values defining this range, e , e , depend on both the expected reserve level
and the degree of volatility.  A fall in the expected reserve level expands the range as
does an increase in volatility. (See (15) and (16)).
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An important implication is that greater reserve volatility has a non-linear effect
on the supply of international credit.  Greater volatility does not affect the supply of
credit when the expected reserve position is large enough so there can be a full bailout.11
But suppose the expected reserve position is low enough so that the size of the bailout
might be constrained by the scarcity of reserves.  Then the impact of greater reserve
volatility is magnified by the expected bailout in the range where the scarcity of
reserves binds partially.  In terms of Figure 3b, greater reserve volatility shifts down a
segment of the expected repayment line and widens the range [e , e ]  where the scarcity
of reserves binds partially.  The net effect of higher reserve volatility is minimal around
point Q, which corresponds to the case of no volatility (l =0), but it progressively gets
larger as volatility increases (as we move to line segment M'M and then down to
segment S'S).
The above considerations may be illustrated more formally.  Let ˜ f *  be the
probability of a bailout defined by ˜ f * =
f * f(e )de
e
e 
ò
e - e
. 12  Applying (15) and (16),
˜ f * =
f * f(e )de
e
e 
ò
e - e
=
f * f(e )de
e
e 
ò
2F *l /( c Y*)
 .  Substituting this expression into (22) gives:
        
dB1
*
dl |r
= - l F *( ) 2 ˜ f * 1
HB1*
' c Y*
 < 0                  (23)
From (23) we observe that the leftward shift in the supply of international credit when
there is reserve volatility is larger as reserve volatility increases or as the probability of
                                                
11This will be the case if e = e = - e 0 . Applying (14) and (15), this is equivalent to
[(1+ r )B1
* - c Y *(1- e 0)]/(1- l ) < F 
* .
12Assuming that f *  is a continuous function, there exists a unique value of e  such that
e > e > e  , satisfying this condition.
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bailouts rises.  The intuition for the latter result is based on a time inconsistency story .
A declared "no bailout" policy is not credible in regimes where the "too big to fail"
argument or the lobbying of pressure groups forces the government to use international
reserves for bailouts. In these circumstances, the lack of transparency of international
reserves acts as a tax.  The tax is larger in weak regimes where the probability of bailout
is considered high.
Inspection of (18) reveals that the leftward shift in the supply of credit due to
greater reserve uncertainty takes place only if reserve scarcity is a binding constraint.
Reserve scarcity binds as long as productivity shocks lie in the range - e 0 £ e £ e ,
where we have assumed - e 0 < e .  Given the definition of e  in (15), the assumption that
- e 0 < e  is equivalent to
(1+ r)B1
* - c Y *(1- e 0) > F 
*(1- l ) (24)
This condition implies that the supply of international credit is reduced by greater
reserve volatility when the potential bailout in the worst state of nature (defined by the
lowest productivity shock) is greater than the lowest possible reserve level. This
condition is more likely to hold the lower is expected international reserves and the
greater is the volatility of reserves.  Such reserve uncertainty characterized the Korean
episode and can help explain the collapse of the international credit market facing that
emerging market.
18
IV. Conclusion
The unwillingness of foreign lenders to extend new credits or to roll over
existing credits to emerging markets is thought to have been an important precipitating
factor in the 1997-98 Asian crisis [Chang and Velasco (1998a, 1998b), Radelet and
Sachs (1998)]  This paper shows that when loan repayments become less certain,
foreign lenders are less willing to offer international credit.  More importantly, it
demonstrates that reserve volatility can, under plausible circumstances, induce large
adverse effects for emerging markets.  Volatility that is benign when nonlinearities are
absent generates large costs when nonlinear restrictions bind.  We observe that when the
expected reserve position of emerging markets is large relative to the potential bailout in
a bad state of nature, reserve volatility is unimportant.  The same amount of reserve
volatility can cause a large reduction in the offered supply of international credit if the
emerging market’s foreign debt is large enough or if the collapse of output forces the
private sector to downgrade its priors regarding repayment possibilities.  In addition,
reserve volatility that was formerly benign may lead to a reduced supply of international
credit once investors become more pessimistic about the expected reserve position of
emerging markets.13
                                                
13The interaction between volatility and nonlinearity may help explain the finding that
higher macroeconomic volatility in emerging markets is associated with lower private
investment and economic growth.  See Aizenman and Marion (1999).
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FIGURE 1: Korean Official and Usable Reserves
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FIGURE 2:  Korean Foreign Currency Reserves
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Figure 3a
                      Curve N'M' MLK  corresponds to the expected repayment when l = 0.2
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Figure 3b
Curve N'QK  corresponds to l =0, curve N'M MK  corresponds to l =0.2, curve N'S'SK
corresponds to l =0.4. Drawn for c = 0.4;Y * = 1;F * = 0.2;r = 0.1;B1
* = 0.5;e 0 = 0.6.
         FIGURE 3:  Expected Repayment with Reserve Uncertainty
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